Recent Developments

ALIEN CHECKPOINTS AND THE TROUBLESOME
TETRALOGY: UNITED STATES v.
MARTINEZ-FUERTE
INTRODUCTION

In a 7 to 2 decision,' the Supreme Court has ruled Border Patrol
agents may stop vehicles at fixed checkpoints and briefly question
the occupants even though no reason exists to believe the vehicle
contains unlawfully entered aliens. 2 The Court also held that a judicial warrant is unnecessary to operate a checkpoint. In resolving
a split among the courts of appeals,4 the Supreme Court has completed a significant phase of search and seizure law which began
with the seminal case of Almeida-Sanchez v. United States.5
1. Mr. Justice Powell wrote the opinion for the majority. Mr. Justice
Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Marshall concurred.
2. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct 3074 (1976). The case was
decided together with Sifuentes v. United States, id. All references to
parties and their briefs are to the principal case only.
3. 96 S. Ct. at 3086.
4. Compare United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308 (9th Cir.
1975) (routine checkpoint operations unconstitutional), with United States
v. Santibanez, 517 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1975), and United States v. Bowman,
487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973) (routine checkpoint operations constitutional).
5. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). For a detailed discussion of procedural strategies arguably available in deportation hearings when an alien has been illegally arrested, see Fragomen, Procedural Aspects of Illegal Search and
Seizure in DeportationCases, 14 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 151 (1976).

Almeida-Sanchez held that Border Patrol officers on roving patrol may not search vehicles without consent or traditional probable
cause. 6 In United States v. Ortiz,7 the Supreme Court extended this
holding to searches at fixed checkpoints. The same day Ortiz was
decided,8 the Court ruled on the constitutionality of a law enforcement practice less intrusive than a search-a brief stop and inquiry
about the detainee's citizenship. That case, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,9 held that Border Patrol officers on roving patrol may
stop vehicles and question the occupants only if the officers have
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains aliens unlawfully
present. 10 In Martinez-Fuerte, which involved traffic checking
procedures at the San Clemente, California, checkpoint, the Supreme Court refused to require that investigative stops and inquiries be based on reasonable suspicion.1"
One difficulty with Martinez-Fuerteis its inconsistency with previous rulings. The dissenting Justices declared the holding could
not be reconciled with Aimeida-Sanchez, Ortiz, and BrignoniPonce.12 However, the majority accepted the Government's contention that checkpoint stops13 are significantly different from roving
6. 413 U.S. at 273. The case was the subject of much discussion in the pe-

riodicals. E.g., Note, Almeida-Sanchez and Its Progeny: The Developing
Border Zone Search Law, 17 Aiz. L. Rnv. 214 (1975); Note, Area Search
Warrantsin Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara, 84 YALE L.J. 355
(1974).
7. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).

8. The decision was handed down on June 30, 1975, the last day of the
Supreme Court's term. Similarly, Martinez-Fuerte was announced on the
final day of this year's term, July 6, 1976.
9. 422 U.S.873 (1975).
10. Id. at 884. Reasonable suspicion requires a quantum of suspicion less

than that of probable cause. It is based on "specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant
suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country." Id. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
11. 96 S. Ct. at 3084 (1976).

12. Id. at 3088 (dissenting opinion).

13. Routine procedures at the San Clemente checkpoint are twofold. All
traffic is funnelled into two lanes and brought to a stop at the checkpoint
through the use of flashing red lights and signs. A "point" officer, stationed
between the two lines of traffic, surveys each vehicle and either waves it

through or refers it to a secondary inspection area off the highway where
other officers make further visual inspection and question the occupants

about their citizenship. The average length of this secondary inspection is
three to five minutes. Only a small percentage of vehicles are referred to
the secondary area. Id. at 3077.
Routine operations in Sifuentes involved the checkpoint near Sarita,
Texas. The checkpoint i& located on U.S. Highway 77, more than sixtyfive miles from the border. Traffic checking procedures differ from those
at San Clemente in that all passing motorists, except for recognized local
inhabitants, are stopped for brief inquiry. Id. at 3079.
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patrol stops in the two aspects which control the reasonableness
balance: With the former, the law enforcement need is greater, and
the intrusion on fourth amendment 14 interests is lesser.15
The thesis of this Comment is that the foregoing contention cannot withstand careful examination. The Government's need to conduct routine checkpoint operations is no greater than its need to
conduct roving patrol operations. With the former, the intrusion on
fourth amendment rights is as onerous, and the overall burden on
lawful traffic is more considerable. In addition, the Court made
several questionable factual assumptions and altered the traditional
allocation of the burden of proof with respect to warrantless law enforcement conduct. This Comment will summarize the factual context of the case, examine the Ninth Circuit's holding, which the Supreme Court reversed, and analyze the Supreme Court's decision.
THE ILLEGAL IMzMGRATioN PROBLEM
Scope of the Problem
The current annual quota for foreign immigrants is 290,000120,000 of which are allocated for Western Hemisphere countries, including Mexico.' 6 The Immigration and Naturalization Service has
7
estimated that 250,000 immigrants enter unlawfully every year.'
The number of undocumented aliens currently residing in this
country has been estimated to be as high as 12 million,' 8 but is now
placed by the Service at 8.2 million.' 9 Between 65 and 85 percent
14. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV reads:
The right to the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
15. Brief for Petitioner at 17, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct.
3074 (1976).
16. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a) (27) & 1151(a) (1970). See also Jensen, U.S.
Economy Eroded By "Silent Invasion," San Diego Union, June 28, 1976, §
A, at 1, col. 1.
For a thorough discussion of the procedure for obtaining an immigrant
visa, see Comment, How to Immigrate to the United States: A Practical
Guide for the Attorney, 14 SAx DiEGo L. Rav. 193 (1976).
17. Jensen, supra note 16. As recently as 190, the figure was 40,000.
Id.
18. United States v. Martinez-Fuert% 96 S. Ct. at 3079.
19. Jensen, supra note 16.

are from Mexico. 2°
In fiscal 1975 Service officers located 766,600 deportable aliens.2 1
Of these, 680,392 were Mexican; 22 667,689 of the deportable aliens
entered the country by crossing the border surreptitiously. Ninetynine percent of these entries were made across the 2,000 mile-long
Mexican border.23 Once inside the country, undocumented aliens
seek to travel inland to labor market areas, often employing the
services of professional smugglers. 24 Opinions differ sharply about
whether these aliens' enjoyment of public services and eventual em25
ployment within the United States adversely affect the economy.

Primary responsibility for prevention of illegal entry and apprehension of illegal entrants falls on the service branch known as the
United States Border Patrol. Formed in 1924, the Border Patrol is
comprised of 1700 officers, 80 percent of whom are assigned to the
Mexican-American border area. 26 The Border Patrol has two basic
functions: preventing illegal entry by a linewatch 2 7and detecting
aliens by traffic checking and other inland operations.
The Border Linewatch
Although common sense dictates that the best place to concentrate enforcement efforts is at the border itself, the Government
and the Supreme Court have concluded that stopping the influx of
20. Compare id., with United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. at 3080.

21. 1975 INS, ANNUAL RaPORT 13. This number represented a slight decrease from the 788,145 aliens located in 1974, the first such decrease in more
than ten years. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S.Ct. at 3080.
25. E.g., one study done by a private consulting firm in Washington, D.C., estimated that undocumented aliens cost at least $13 billion
annually in public services and in lost wages, unemployment, and welfare benefits for American citizens who would otherwise be employed. Jensen, supra note 16. In contrast are the results of a Department of Labor
Study released November 19, 1975, which concluded that: "The involvement of illegals in taxpaying is much more pronounced than their use of
tax-supported systems." The study indicated that 77 percent of the undocumented aliens sampled pay social security taxes, and 73 percent pay federal
income taxes. In addition, only 0.5 percent received welfare benefits; 1.3
percent received food stamps; 3.9 percent received one or more weeks of
unemployment benefits, and 7.6 percent were parents with children in public schools. Forty-four percent made hospitalization payments, while 27.4
percent used federal hospitals or clinics. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 21, 1975,
pt. I, at 8, col. 2.
26. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 906 (1975).
27. See id.
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undocumented aliens at the border is impossible.28

The Court

stated in Brignoni-Ponce:
The Mexican border is almost 2,000 miles long, and even a vastly
reinforced Border Patrol would find it impossible to prevent illegal
border crossings. Many aliens cross the Mexican border on foot,
miles away from patrolled areas, and then purchase transportation
where they find jobs and
from the border area to inland cities,
29
elude the immigration authorities.

Even though the Border Patrol maintains electronic sensors,30
easy
fences, and personnel along the border, "it remains relatively
31
detection."
without
States
United
the
enter
to
individuals
for

Inland Checkpoints
The Border Patrol's inland traffic checking operations consist of
roving patrols and fixed checkpoints of a permanent or temporary
nature.32 There are seventeen permanent and thirty temporary
checkpoints located in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. 33 The Government states checkpoint operations have
always been the single most important element of the enforcement
plan, in terms both of apprehending illegal entrants and of deter[A]lthough roving patrol operations
ring unauthorized entry....
have historically been an important part of the Border Patrol's traffic checking program, they have always been essentially supplementary to the checkpoints themselves which are the heart of the

enforcement effort. 34

28. Brief for Petitioner at 17-18, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S.
Ct. 3074 (1976).
29. 422 U.S. at 879.
30. The Border Patrol also utilizes "Chekar" devices in areas both near
to and removed from the immediate border. These devices are imbedded
underground in highways and send out a signal when a vehicle or any large
mass of metal passes over it. United States v. Shields, 534 F.2d 605, 606 n.1
(5th Cir. 1976). In Shields, Border Patrol officers stopped a car which had
tripped a Chekar implanted near Hebronville, Texas, more than sixty-five
miles from the Mexican border. The court held the stop was unconstitutional because there was no reasonable suspicion to believe the car contained undocumented aliens. Id. at 608.
31. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. at 3080.
32. Id. The statutory authority for traffic checking operations is con-

ferred by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357 (a) (1) & (a) (3)

(1970).

Under current regula-

tions the authority conferred by § 1357(a) (3) may be exercised within 100
miles of the border. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 (a) (2) (1976).
33. These fall within the jurisdiction of six different federal judicial districts. Brief for Petitioner at 39, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S.
Ct. 3074 (1976).
34. Id. at 19-20.

Traffic checkpoints are located on major and minor highways
leading away from the border. The Government contends the
checkpoints must be operated more than twenty-five miles from the
border because many illegal aliens abuse the use of border passes
authorizing travel within twenty-five miles of the border during a
seventy-two hour period. 35 Other factors affecting location are the
terrain surrounding the highway, concentration of traffic, confluence of roads leading away from the border, and safety of conduct36
ing a traffic slowdown.
The San Clemente checkpoint is the primary checkpoint in southern California,3 7 and the busiest of all the Service's checkpoints.
Approximately 10 million cars pass through the checkpoint annually.38 Although traffic along Interstate 5 is said to be lightest at the
location of the checkpoint, 9 the checkpoint is forced to close down
during peak traffic hours.40 The surrounding geography was an additional determinant of the checkpoint's location because of the difficulty in traveling around it. The presence of Camp Pendleton
Marine Corps Base on the east and the Pacific Ocean on the west
marked the area as "a natural corridor along which illegal aliens
frequently travel in their migration towards the labor markets in
the north." 41 The distance from the border, sixty-six road miles,
ensures that unlawful entrants cannot use border passes, but also
dictates that most motorists passing through are lawfully within
the country.
THE NINTH CIRcuiT's HOLDING

A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit held that Border Patrol officers, absent a valid warrant, must have founded suspicion in order
to stop a vehicle at a checkpoint. 42 The court considered this to be
35. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S.Ct. at 3080. Nonimmigrant
visitors may obtain these cards by filling out form 1-186. 8 C.F.R. § 212.6
(1976). In addition, certain classes of aliens may obtain Registration Receipt Cards (green cards), form 1-151, to be used in lieu of immigrant visas.
Id. § 211.1(b).
36. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. at 3080.
37. The checkpoint is actually located at San Onofre, five miles south
of San Clemente. It is on Interstate 5, the major highway connecting Callfornia's two largest cities, San Diego and Los Angeles. It is located sixtysix road miles north of the border. Id. at 3077.
38. Id. at 3081.
39. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 415 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
40. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct.,at 3081 n.10. Because of
this factor and of occasional bad weather and manpower shortages, the
checkpoint is operable only about 70 percent of the time. Id. at 3081.
41. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 415 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
42. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308, 315 (9th Cir. 1975).
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"the logical, and predictable, next step in the development of search
and seizure doctrine under Almeida-Sanchez v. United States
....

"43

The court began by examining the intrusion on fourth

amendment interests created by checkpoint stops. It noted that
even a fleeting stop was subject to fourth amendment protection
and that the minimal requirement for stopping a vehicle within the
jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit had long been founded suspicion."
The court discerned no substantial distinction between a stop of a
45
vehicle at a checkpoint and a roving stop.

The majority rejected the Government's argument that checkpoint operations were necessary for successful enforcement of the
immigration laws. 6 Applying the doctrine of less onerous alternatives, the majority stated "given the present border patrol manpower, there are simply two [sic] few fingers to plug the many
leaks in the dike . ... 47 Additional alternatives noted by the
court were eliminating the green card and border pass programs
and inducing Congress48 to impose sanctions on employers who hire
undocumented aliens.
The court had previously held routine stops at San Clemente require a
founded suspicion. United States v. Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 7 (9th Cir.
1974). The Government then obtained a "warrant of inspection" to operate

the checkpoint during the summer of 1974. The Martinez-Fuerte court devoted much of its opinion to the issue of whether "the warrant of inspection
somehow transforms otherwise unreasonable seizures into constitutional
ones." 514 F.2d at 315. The court noted the supporting affidavits contained
no particularized facts about individual vehicles and that the warrant did
not interpose the mediating judgment of a magistrate, for it authorized the
stopping of vehicles and detention of motorists solely at the discretion of
the Border Patrol officers. The court concluded the warrant could not be
justified under established fourth amendment principles. Id. at 315-16.
43. 514 F.2d at 314.
44. United States v. Jaime-Barrios, 494 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Ward, 488 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bugarin-Casas,
484 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1973); Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966).
No substantial difference exists between the requirements of founded suspicion and reasonable suspicion. United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476,
477 (9th Cir. 1975).
45. Indeed, the court did not specifically deal with the contention that
checkpoint stops are less intrusive so as to require less protection under
the fourth amendment. The court stated simply that investigative checkpoint stops involved "precisely the unconstitutional conduct" it had condemned in cases dealing with checkpoint searches and roving patrol stops.
514 F.2d at 315.
46. Id. at 318.
47. Id.

48. Id. at 319.

More significant than the court's rejection of the Government's
necessity argument was its suggestion that even if routine checkpoint operations were necessary to apprehend undocumented aliens,
they would not be constitutional. The court rejected the notion
that "somehow the asserted need to conduct such immigration seizures and searches establishes adequate
cause to disrupt the normal
49
flow of traffic on a major highway.

The Ninth Circuit's decision differs from that of the Supreme
Court in four ways. First, the lower court found no constitutional
difference between the seizure occasioned by an investigative checkpoint stop and that occasioned by a roving stop. Second, the court
was not persuaded by the Government's argument that routine
checkpoint operations were necessary to enforce the immigration
laws. Third, the court found the rate of undocumented alien apprehension at the checkpoint to be miniscule in comparison with the
volume of legitimate traffic which passes through the checkpoint.
The court noted that of 145,960 vehicles which passed through the
checkpoint during an eight-day period, 820 were referred to the secondary inspection area. Of these, 171 contained undocumented aliens. Thus only .12 percent of the vehicles passing through were
found to contain undocumented aliens,"
Finally, and most significantly, the Ninth Circuit employed an entirely different mode of constitutional adjudication. The core of its
inquiry was the intrusion on fourth amendment rights caused by
checkpoint seizures. The court did not employ a balancing test under which the asserted government need is initially viewed in parity
with the protected private interests. Rather, the court implied that
consideration of the argument of law enforcement need was beyond
the scope of judicial review.' 1 As authority for this approach the
Ninth Circuit quoted the Supreme Court, which had stated in Almeida-Sanchez:
It is not enough to argue, as does the Government, that the problem
of deterring unlawful entry by aliens across long expanses of na-

tional boundaries is a serious one. The needs of law enforcement

49. Id. at 318. The court stated "the mere fact that protecting a constitutional right will impose a heavy burden on the federal fise is not a proper
ground for our failure to protect that right." Id. at 318-19. After this decision, the Border Patrol abandoned most of its checkpoint operations in California and Arizona. Brief for Petitioner at 24-25, United States v. MartinezFuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
50. 514 F.2d at 313-14.
51. The court asserted: "It is not our business to tell the executive how
to enforce the laws, nor to tell the Congress what laws to enact." Id. at
3.18.
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stand in constant tension with the Constitution's protections of the
individual against certain exercises of official power. It is precisely
that counsels a resolute loyalty
the predictability of these pressures
to constitutional safeguards. 52
THE Suprmim CouRT's HOLDING

Summary of the Opinion
The Supreme Court's holding was limited to permanent traffic

checkpoints. 5 The Court held that Border Patrol officers may stop
all vehicles on the highway even without any measure of suspicion
that a particular vehicle contains undocumented aliens. 54 The
Court also held that officers may selectively refer vehicles to a secondary area for further visual inspection and for questioning about
citizenship, again in the absence of any quantum of suspicion. 56 The

Court restricted this random investigative conduct to the stop and
brief detention of a vehicle for questioning of the occupants, stating
that a search or any further detention of the vehicle and its passengers must be based either on consent or on probable cause.56
The Court conceded that checkpoint stops are "seizures" within
the meaning of the fourth amendment. 57 However, it found the interference with fourth amendment interests "quite limited" and
outweighed by the "great" law enforcement need to make checkpoint stops.58 The Court concluded that the overall degree of inter-

ference with legitimate traffic was less than that caused by random
roving patrol stops. 9 Finally, the majority held the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment inapplicable because checkpoints display visible manifestations of the field officer's legitimate

authority and because the decision to "seize" is not entirely in the
field officers' hands but rather is shared by higher ranking officials.60
CriticalAnalysis and Evaluation
The Supreme Court's decision is based on nine distinct proposi52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id., citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
96 S. Ct. at 3080.
Id. at 3084.
Id. at 3085.
Id. at 3087.
Id. at 3082.

58. Id.

59. Id. at 3083.
60. Id. at 3086.

tions. Five are factual, and four are theories of law. These will be
discussed separately, beginning with the factual propositions.
The Necessity of Checkpoint Operations
The core of the Government's argument, and a recurrent theme
throughout the opinion, is the law enforcement need to apprehend
undocumented aliens enroute to labor market areas in the interior.
The contention that checkpoint operations are necessary to further this need is based on two sub-propositions: Checkpoint operations are an effective means of apprehending undocumented aliens
and deterring unlawful entry, and no reasonable, less intrusive alternatives exist.
Effectiveness of Checkpoint Operations
In general, the Government's claim that checkpoint operations
impose an "effective obstacle""' and deter unlawful entry cannot be
substantiated by the facts.6 2 The number of undocumented aliens
in the country and the present rate of unlawful entry belie these
claims. 68 The statistics cited by the Court do not complete the picture. For example, the Court noted that over 17,000 were apprehended at the San Clemente checkpoint in 1973,64 but failed to mention that approximately 320,000 traverse Interstate 5 each year. 5
Thus only about 5 percent of the undocumented aliens passing
6
through the checkpoint are apprehended.0
Part of the problem is the conceded inability of the Border Patrol
to operate the checkpoints on a full-time basis. 67 Thus in addition
to the vast numbers who slip through undetected, many undocumented aliens, by chance or device, pass the checkpoint while it is
inoperative. The Court's conclusion that in the absence of checkpoint operations the highways "would offer illegal aliens a quick
and safe route into the interior"66 is rendered hollow by the fact
that with checkpoints in operation the same holds true for 95 percent of the traveling aliens.
61. Brief for Petitioner at 20, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct.
3074 (1976).
62. See Brief for Respondents at 34-36, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
63. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
64. 96 S. Ct. at 3081.
65. Brief for Respondents at 36 n.18, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
66. Id.
67. See note 40 supra.

68. 96 S. Ct. at 3082.
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Alternatives to Checkpoints
The Supreme Court noted that 55,300 deportable aliens were apprehended in fiscal 1973 through traffic checking operations.6 9 That
number, however, represents a mere 8 percent of the total number
of deportable aliens apprehended during that year. More than
600,000 deportable aliens were apprehended by enforcement operations other than traffic checking programs.7 0 To support the argument that checkpoints are necessary is at best difficult.
The Court said: "Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance of a traffic checking program in the interior is necessary because the flow of illegal aliens cannot be controlled effectively at
the border."7 1 It is also true, however, that the internal flow of undocumented aliens cannot be controlled effectively by traffic checkpoints. Moreover, in fiscal 1973 the number of unlawful entrants
apprehended at the border was more than three times the number
located by traffic-checking programs. 7 2 Thus the converse of the
Court's statement is better supported by the facts: Maintenance of
the linewatch operations is necessary because the inland migration
of unlawful entrants cannot be controlled.
This realization leads to two important observations. First, it appears a decision affirming the Ninth Circuit and precluding routine
checkpoint operations would have forced the Border Patrol into a
more effective allocation of its manpower. Current manpower allotments support this assumption. For example, during a typical
day shift in California, only thirty officers are devoted to patrolling
the entire California-Mexican border.7 3 This number could be supplemented by the forty-seven officers employed for a twenty-four
hour operation of the San Clemente checkpoint alone.7 4 Thus a
shutdown of the checkpoints would permit greater concentration of
69. Id. at 3080.

70. Brief for Respondents at 35 n.17, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). Because the 8 percent figure includes all traffic
checking operations, the percentage of the total apprehended at checkpoints

is even smaller. Id.
71. 96 S. Ct. at 3082.
72. 175,511 aliens were apprehended at the border. Id. at 3080.
73. Brief for Respondents at 38, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S.
Ct. 3074 (1976).
74. Id.

manpower at the border, where far more illegal entrants are apprehended.7 5
Second, the decision to allocate manpower is an administrative
one which should be left to the executive and legislative branches.
By straining to justify, in terms of law enforcement need, the annual seizure of millions of lawful motorists, the Court has played a
major role in an administrative decision which the facts and circumstances show to be unsound. Mr. Justice White described this problem succinctly in his concurring opinion in Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz: 76

Perhaps the Judiciary should not strain to accommodate the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the needs of a system
which at best can demonstrate only minimal effectiveness as long as
it is lawful for business firms and others to employ aliens who are
illegally in the country. This problems, which ordinarily law enforcement has not been able to solve, essentially poses questions of
national policy and is chiefly the business of Congress and the
Executive Branch rather than the courts. 7

Although the facts clearly indicate the effectiveness of alternative
alien-detection programs, the Court gave summary treatment to
consideration of the less-restrictive-means doctrine. 78 The majority's consideration of alternatives is contained entirely in footnote
12 of the opinion. The note contains several important revelations
79
which deserve separate discussion.
Footnote 12 begins by stating:
The defendants argue at length that the public interest in maintain-

ing checkpoints is less than is asserted by the Government because
the flow of illegal immigrants could be reduced by means other
than checkpoint operations. As one alternative they suggest
legislation prohibiting the knowing employment of illegal aliens.

75. The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion. 514 F.2d at 318.
76. The concurring opinion applied to both cases.
77. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 915 (1975). By joining in the
majority opinion for Martinez-Fuerte,Mr. Justice White apparently ignored
his own cogent advice. This is particularly surprising in light of his statement in Ortiz that "under the Court's opinions checkpoint investigative
stops, without search, will be difficult to justify under the Fourth Amendment absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion." Id.
78. The other immigration law enforcement programs, which account for
the apprehension of more than 90 percent of all deportable aliens located,
include linewatch operations, public transportation inspections of buses,
trains, and aircraft, metropolitan patrols, industrial checking, farm and
ranch checking, and a boat patrol and stowaway inspection program. In
addition, many aliens are apprehended by other law enforcement agencies
and turned over to the Service. Brief for Respondents at 28, United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
79. One such revelation involves the burden of proof and is dealt with
in the text accompanying note 138 infra.
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The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments
could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all
search and seizure powers. 8

First, it is no more elaborate to argue such alternatives as imposing
sanctions on employers8 1 than it is to argue the necessity of check-

point operations given the demonstrated inefficiency of the latter.
Second, the Court ignored the fact that alternative law enforcement
programs currently employed account for well over 90 percent of
the apprehensions of undocumented aliens.82 The logic of the lessrestrictive-alternative arguments in the present context does not

bar the exercise of all search and seizure powers, but only of those
which unnecessarily sanction intrusive and arbitrary conduct. The
Court continued in the footnote:
In any event, these arguments tend to go to the general proposition
are impermissible, a premise
that all traffic-checking 8procedures
3

our previous cases reject.

Nowhere did respondents' brief argue that all traffic-checking procedures should be impermissible. Respondents cited as one reason-

able alternative the roving patrol car observations presently conducted by Border Patrol officers in areas near the border.8 4

Re-

spondents also cited approvingly a traffic-checking procedure which
was utilized by the Border Patrol and which made use of the San
Clemente checkpoint as a base of operation to receive calls and con80. 96 S. Ct. at 3082 n.12.
81. Several bills designed to make unlawful or otherwise limit the employment of aliens have been considered in Congress during recent years,
but none has been enacted. The "Rodino Bill," H.R. 982, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973), was passed by the House of Representatives on May 3, 1973,
but never acted upon by the Senate. Brief for Respondents at 31 n.12,
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). For discussion of

the status of the various congressional bills penalizing the knowing employ-

ment of undocumented aliens, see Recent Developments in Immigration
Law 1976, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 301, 303-07 (1976).
It is also possible for individual states to enact comparable legislation.
See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1976). The United States
Supreme Court has recently upheld the California statute against a claim
of federal preemption. DeCanas v. Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933 (1976). For an analysis of the DeCanas decision, see Recent Development, Preemption in the
Field of Immigration: DeCanas v. Bica, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 282 (1976).
82. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
83. 96 S. Ct. at 3082 n.12.
84. Brief for Respondents at 28, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S.
Ct. 3074 (1976). These can lead to stops if facts warranting reasonable suspicion exist. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).

duct reasonable suspicion stops.85 Respondents' position was not
that all traffic checking procedures are unconstitutional; rather,
they challenged only those allowing stops of vehicles in the absence
of any suspicion that undocumented aliens were within.
Impracticality of Imposing a Requirement of Reasonable
Suspicion
The Supreme Court stated:
A requirement that stops on major routes inland always be based
on reasonable suspicion would be impractical because the flow of
traffic tends to be too heavy to allow particularized study of a
given car that would allow it to be identified as a possible carrier
of illegal aliens.88

In most instances a stationary officer would lack sufficient time to
observe articulable facts about a given vehicle as it approaches the
checkpoint. The same is not true in the cases of referrals to the secondary area. Once a vehicle is compelled to slow down and come
to a stop at the fingertips of the point officer, that officer and others
would ordinarily be able to observe articulable facts that might
warrant reasonable suspicion.8 7 Assuming arguendo the legality of
stopping all motorists, there is no reason referrals to the secondary
inspection area for interrogation should be allowed on less than reasonable suspicion. The Court ignored this possibility of compromise
and held that further detention and questioning could be made on
a discretionary basis.8 8
The fundamental flaw in the impracticality argument is the notion that the inconvenience of constitutional standards sanctions
their abuse. The logic of the argument could be employed to defeat
all constitutional restrictions on law enforcement practices. This
was made clear by the dissenting opinion:
There is no principle in the jurisprudence of fundamental rights
which permits constitutional limitations to be dispensed with merely because they cannot be conveniently satisfied. Dispensing with
reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to stopping and inspecting
motorists because the inconvenience of such a requirement would
make it impossible to identify a given car as a possible carrier of
85. Brief for Respondents at 39-40 n.22, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). Under this procedure, officers on roving patrol near
the checkpoint made calls to the checkpoint to ascertain whether vehicles
under their suspicion had been stopped previously. If an officer received
such information, which was kept on a rolodex, he would stop the car.
Id.
86. 96 S. Ct. at 3082.
87. Id. at 3090 (dissenting opinion).
88. Id. at 3085.
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aliens is no more justifiable than dispensing with probable cause as
prejequisite to the search of an individual because the inconvenience of such a requirement would make it impossible to identify a
given person in a high-crime area as a possible carrier of concealed
weapons.8 9

The Minimal Degree of the Intrusion
The majority conceded that the routine checkpoint investigative
stops intruded on a motorist's rights to "free passage without interruption 9 0 and to personal security under the fourth amendment.9 1
However, the Court contended the intrusion was minimal and of a
nature different from that of the roving patrol stops which Brignoni-Ponce required to be based on reasonable suspicion.9 2 The
contention that investigative checkpoint stops are so less intrusive
than are roving patrol stops, and thus do not require reasonable suspicion, must be carefully examined.
The majority analyzed the effects of the intrusion in terms of an
objective-subjective distinction. 93 Admitting that the objective aspects of routine checkpoint operations are identical to those of roving patrol investigations, the Court stated:
But we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on the
part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the case of a check94
point stop.

The Court continued by quoting from Ortiz:
Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and
their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the
motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see
visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to
be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion. 95
Trying to assess the nature of the official intrusion in terms of the
subjective impact on individuals is almost impossible. Who but that
individual can accurately assess the actual impact of the detention?
The Court can deal only in terms of supposition and probabilities
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 3091.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
96 S.Ct. at 3082.
Id. at 3082-83.

93. Id. at 3083.
94. Id.

95. Id., quoting United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975).

when attempting to measure the subjective impact of law enforcement conduct. The Court advanced no explanation about why motorists who are brought to a stop in the middle of a highway by
flashing red lights, signs, and an armed Border Patrol officer would
be less frightened or annoyed than those who are signaled to pull
over by an officer in a patrol car. 6
Aside from the factual distinctions between roving patrols and
97
checkpoints and from suppositions about their different impact,
the law enforcement activity is clearly identical in all significant aspects and suffers from the same constitutional infirmities. In both
instances motorists and their passengers may be subject to interference with their passage in the form of detention and interrogation. 8
The difference is not in the nature of the intrusions but only in the
surrounding factual context in which they are carried out. Given
the teaching of Brignoni-Poncethat such conduct when pursued on
a causeless basis is unreasonable, 99 it is too late to argue the minimal intrusiveness of the law enforcement activity. Because law enforcement conduct is the subject of the fourth amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures, that conduct should
control the outcome of all cases involving highway searches and
seizures.
Interference with Lawful Traffic
As in Brignoni-Ponce,10 0 the Supreme Court considered the "overall degree of interference with legitimate traffic." 10 1 While noting
96. That checkpoints display visible signs of authority probably does not
lessen the impact of the intrusion. Motorists who are stopped by roving
patrols are given notice of the officers' authority by the appearance of the
car, flashing signal light, and the uniformed attire of the officers. The difference in the display of authority by roving patrols and the San Clemente
checkpoint is largely quantitative-at the latter there are more officers,
more flashing red lights, and usually several patrol cars within sight. Such
a showing of authority may be more frightening or annoying to motorists
who are stopped.
97. As the dissenting opinion noted, even if some significant differences
in the subjective aspects of checkpoint stops did exist, a need remains for
"some principled restraint on law enforcement conduct." 96 S. Ct. at 3089
(dissenting opinion).
98. The majority was certainly aware of the similarity between checkpoint investigative stops and roving stops. In describing the intrusion
caused by routine checkpoint stops, the Court quoted a passage from
Brignoni-Ponce describing roving patrol detentions. Id. at 3082-83, quoting
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975).
99. 422 U.S. at 882.
100. Id. at 882-83.
101. 96 S.Ct. at 3083.
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that random roving patrol stops subjected border area residents to
"potentially unlimited interference with the use of the highways,"'10 2 the majority asserted that with respect to causeless checkpoint stops
"the potential interference with legitimate traffic is
minimal."'1 3 The reasons offered were the motorists' knowledge of
the location of the checkpoints and the activity of Border Patrol officers. The latter was said to be less discretionary and less abusive
than that occasioned by roving stops.10The two reasons advanced are not persuasive. That motorists
know or can obtain knowledge of a checkpoint's location does not
minimize its interference with their travel. If they desire to exercise their constitutional right to uninterrupted travel, 0 5 they will
be stopped and possibly detained for questioning and further inspection. The second contention, that there is less room for discretionary and abusive activity at checkpoints, even if true, 0 6 is not

germane to a discussion of the overall interference with legitimate
traffic. Lawful motorists are nonetheless subjected to a causeless
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Manifestly the overall degree of interference with lawful motorist
traffic is significantly greater in the case of checkpoint stops than
in that of roving stops. Routine checkpoint procedures entail a
stopping of all vehicles passing through, while roving patrol stops
impede only those who are pursued and pulled over. In addition,
the location of the checkpoints guarantees that most of the vehicles
stopped will not contain undocumented aliens. Roving patrol operations take place mainly in the immediate border area, whereas
most checkpoints are positioned away from the border in the interior. Thus, all motorists commuting on the highways may be
stopped, even though only a small percentage are transporting undocumented aliens. This mass interference is particularly aggravated at San Clemente, where the checkpoint interrupts the traffic
flow of the major artery between California's two largest cities, San
Diego and Los Angeles. 10 7
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). Cf. Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
35 (1868).
106. See text accompanying notes 125-30 infrTa.
107. The Ninth Circuit stated: "We cannot countenance the cumulative

The Potential for Discretionary and Abusive Police Conduct
The Martinez-Fuertemajority said:
[C]heckpoint operations both appear to and actually involve less
discretionary enforcement activity. The regularized manner in
which established checkpoints are operated is visible evidence, reassuring to law-abiding motorists, that the stops
are duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest.10 s
It is not clear how the "regularized manner" in which checkpoint
procedures are conducted affects discretionary activity. All vehicles passing through the checkpoint must come to a stop, and the
point officer has complete discretion to choose which ones are to be
referred to the secondary inspection area. 10 9 It is difficult to see
how this subjective choice of individuals for further detention,
which need not be based on any quantum of suspicion, can be limited by the routine manner in which vehicles are stopped. Under
the Supreme Court's holding, no controls are imposed on or standards govern the selective referral by Border Patrol officers. The
law enforcement conduct at issue thus remains completely discretionary in the full sense of the term."i0
The majority also stated:
[S]ince field officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving patrol stops."'
Officers on roving patrol perhaps have a better opportunity for abusive practices than do those at checkpoints where there are probably
other officers, motorists, and better lighting. However, the fact
cannot be ignored that certain features of checkpoint stations might
intrusion of stopping ten million cars per year where only one out of every
1000 passing cars may contain aliens illegally within -the country." United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d at 322.
108. 96 S. Ct. at 3083.
109. At most checkpoints other than San Clemente, the point officer conducts the inquiry himself, but retains discretion to refer vehicles to a secondary area for further questioning. Brief for Petitioner at 52 n.19, United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
110. The majority made the remarkable comment that "selective referrals
-rather than questioning the occupants of every car-tend to advance some
Fourth Amendment interests by minimizing the intrusion on the general
motoring public." 96 S. Ct. at 3084. As the dissenting opinion noted, such
an assertion stands the fourth amendment on its head as it begins from

the starting point that causeless, random intrusions are generally permis-

sible, and any lessening of the intrusions therefore "advances" fourth
amendment interests. Id. at 3089 n.2 (dissenting opinion). The majority's
view is consistent with its perverse treatment of fourth amendment interests
throughout the opinion.
111. Id. at 3083.
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conceivably be used to increase the potential for abuse. 1 2 In any
event, the possibility of abusive law enforcement activities should
not be given undue significance." 3 The reasonableness inquiry is
focused not on the extremities of police misconduct but rather on
the routine operations defended by the Government. Their constitutionality depends on the intrusive nature of the stop, detention,
and interrogation which they entail and which should have controlled the outcome of the case.
No Quantum of Suspicion for Checkpoint Seizures is Required
The Supreme Court noted that "some quantum of individualized
suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or
seizure," but also stated "the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." 1 4 As authority the Court
cited Camara v. Municipal Court," 5 in which administrative building inspections were allowed absent a suspicion that a particular
structure violated a local housing code.
The holding in Camarais no authority for condoning official investigatory conduct absent any degree of particularized cause or
suspicion. Camara permitted building inspections which are "neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of
crime."" 6 More importantly, the Camara inspections may occur
only after issuance of a judicial warrant based on some quantum of
cause to believe a particular building might violate the housing
code. As the Court stated:
[I]t is obvious that "probable cause" to issue a warrant to inspect
must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
inspection are satisfied with respect to a parconducting an area
ticular dwelling.117

The holding in Camara taught the wisdom and practicality of a
compromise between traditional fourth amendment requirements

112. The presence of more officers and the existence of a building or

other structure where an individual may be hidden from public view might
operate to further oppressive law enforcement practices.
113. The author assumes hopefully that the incidence of repressive Border Patrol practices is negligible.

114. 96 S. Ct. at 3084.
115. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

116. Id. at 537.
117. Id. at 538 (emphasis added).

and public law enforcement interests-not subjugation of the former to the latter. Thus although traditional probable cause was not
required, some lesser quantum of proof was. Though suspicion
about the specific nature of the violations was not required, the
Court did require suspicion of violations in a specific building. 118 In
sum, Camara was written neither to countenance absolute abandonment of cause or suspicion nor to condone the arbitrary investigative conduct involved in Martinez-Fuerte. No judicial authority exists to support the random "dragnet-like procedure"'1 9 occasioned
20
by checkpoint operations.1
An additional reason advanced for abandoning the requirement of
any articulable suspicion was the lesser fourth amendment interests
individuals have in the operation of their vehicles. The Court noted
it was dealing
neither with searches nor with the sanctity of private dwellings, ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection ....
As we have noted earlier, one's expectation of privacy
in an automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly
different from the 21traditional expectation of privacy and freedom
in one's residence.'

Apparently, deemphasis of the valid fourth amendment interests
enjoyed by motorists made their eventual abrogation easier. How118. The Court stated as examples the nature of the building, the passage
of time, and the condition of the area as a whole. Id.
119. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. at 3089 (dissenting opinion).
120. As additional authority for the abandonment of individualized suspicion, the Court cited Almeida Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. at 28385 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 288 (White, J., dissenting); United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154
(1925). 96 S. Ct. at 3084. Reference to Biswell and Colonnade, cases which
involved administrative inspections of firearm and liquor dealers, is misplaced. The Supreme Court pointed out in Almeida-Sanchez: "A central
difference between those cases and this one is that businessmen engaged
in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as
well as the benefits of their trade ....

The businessman in a regulated

industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him." 413 U.S.
at 271.
The Court's citation of Carroll was in reference to the oft-quoted language
which authorizes the stopping of all travelers at the internationalboundary
for purposes of "national selfprotection." 267 U.S. at 154. The language
immediately preceding this passage in Carroll is much more on point to
the issue of random inland stops: "It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the
chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the
highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search." Id. at 153-

54.

121. 96 S. Ct. at 3084 (citations omitted).
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ever, the differences between a person's privacy interest in his home
and interest in the ownership and operation of his automobile
should not affect protection of the latter. The Supreme Court had
previously stated that:
This inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the
homeowner closeted in
citizen on the streets of our cities as to the
22
his study to dispose of his secret affairs.'
123
Further, as the Court recognized in Carroll v. United States,
motorists have a constitutional interest which the private home
dweller does not-the right to free passage on the highway without

interruption. 12 4 The interests in privacy and freedom enjoyed by

travelers on the highway are both important and constitutionally
protected. That they are qualitatively distinguishable from the interests a person has in his home should have played no part in the
Court's decision.
Checkpoint Stops Need not be Authorized by a Warrant
By allowing investigatory seizures without any showing of cause
or suspicion, the Supreme Court rendered inapplicable the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment. 1 25 This requirement had
previously been explained by the Court:
The point of the Fourth Amendment ... is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate inin the often competistead of being judged by the officer engaged
tive enterprise of ferreting out crime.' 26
Under the Court's holding, Border Patrol officers need not assess

any evidence or draw any inferences, because no cause for their actions is necessary. The magistrate, who traditionally makes his own
determination of cause or suspicion, thus has no role in the deci1 27
sion.
122. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968). See also Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
123. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
124. Id. at 153-54.., The Court had previously stated that the fourth
amendment "protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to
do with privacy at all." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at,350.
125. 96 S. Ct. at 3086.
126. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).

127. Viewed as an exception to the warrant requirement, checkpoint

One proposition the majority offered in rationalizing its bypass of
the warrant requirement deserves comment. The Court stated that
the discretionary activity of the patrol officers was lessened by the
decision of higher ranking officials concerning the location of the
checkpoints. 128 Noting the purpose of the warrant requirement to
substitute a magistrate's judgment for that of the field officer's, the
majority asserted:
But the need for this is reduced when the decision to "seize" is not
entirely in the hands of the officer in the field, and deference is to
be given
to the administrative decisions of higher ranking offi29
cials.1

Although higher-ranking officials might determine the location of
the checkpoints, the Court conceded that "Border Patrol officers
must have wide discretion in selecting the motorists to be diverted
for the brief questioning involved."' 18 0 The precise location of a
checkpoint bears little relation to the issue of unhampered discretion. All major and most minor roads leading into the interior will
be blocked by traffic checkpoints at some spot. It is probably small
comfort to lawful motorists who are stopped and possibly detained
further to know that the place of their detention could have been
a few miles away and that it was chosen by a higher-ranking official.
There is an even more fundamental defect in the Court's reasoning. The warrant procedure does not contemplate a distinction
within the executive branch between field officers and administrative officials, but instead between the executive on the one hand
and the judiciary on the other.' 31 The perversion of such a rudimentary principle evidences the extent of the Court's disregard for
fourth amendment rights.
Selective Referrals Made upon the Basis of Race are Permissible
In a broadly-sweeping passage the Martinez-FuerteCourt stated:
We further believe that it is constitutional to refer motorists sestops appear to be the most broadly based in terms of investigative scope

and the least justified in terms of exigent circumstances.
128. 96 S.Ct. at 3083.
129. Id. at 3086.
130. Id. at 3085.
131. In United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317
(1972), the Court stated: "The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate
the executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates ....
[T]hose charged with this investigative and prosecutorial duty
should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive
means in pursuing their tasks."

(vor.
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lectively to the secondary inspection area at the San Clemente
checkpoint on the basis of criteria that would not sustain a roving
patrol stop. Thus, even if it be assumed that such referrals are
Mexican ancestry, we permade largely on the basis of apparent
13 2
ceive no constitutional violation.

There can be no doubt that Latin Americans who reside lawfully

within the country and whose appearance reflects their ancestry
will bear the brunt of the decision. 133 The Court has given Border

Patrol officers carte blanche to make selective interrogations based
upon nothing more than the apparent ethnicity of the detainee. The
potential for abuse is enormous in light of the large number of
Latin Americans residing lawfully in the southwest, particularly in
southern California.-3 4 In United States v. Mallides, the Ninth Circuit took judicial notice that
135
there is a large Mexican-American population in the Oceanside[ ]
[I] t is impossible to determine from looking at a person
area ....
of Mexican descent whether he is an American citizen, a Mexican
national with proper entry papers, or a Mexican alien without papers.136

In another case the Ninth Circuit noted that Los Angeles has the
largest Mexican population of any city on the continent, with the
137
exception of Mexico City.
In addition to condoning the type of arbitrary law enforcement
conduct precluded by the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court
approved enforcement procedures which may deprive Latin Americans of the right to equal protection.'3" Although discriminatory
action based on the criterion of race traditionally invokes close judicial scrutiny,' 3 9 the Court's summary treatment of this issue indi132. 96 S. Ct. at 3085.
133. Id. at 3089-901 (dissenting opinion).
134. The Court cited 1970 census figures showing that 16 percent of California's population, over three million people, were Spanish speaking or
Spanish surnamed. Id. at 3085 n.16. Approximately 52 percent of the inhabitants of the Imperial Valley, located in southern California, are Mexican-American. Brief for Respondents at 42, United States v. MartinezFuerte, 96 S.Ct. 3074 (1976).
135. Oceanside is eighteen miles south of San Clemente.
136. 473 F.2d 859, 860 (9th Cir. 1973).
137. Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283, 286 (9th Cir. 1963).
138. While the fourteenth amendment provides that no state may deprive
a person of equal protection of the laws, the due process clause of the fifth
amendment should impose the same restriction on federal authorities. See
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-50D (1954).
139. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1969); McLaughlin v.

encates that it did not seriously consider the consequences of mass
140
laws.
the
under
protection
equal
to
right
croachments on the
Allocation of the Burden of Proof
The Government's success with its unsubstantiated claim of law
enforcement need may have resulted from the majority's tampering
with the traditional burden of proof regarding warrantless law enforcement activities. Although the Court made no specific mention
of who had the burden of proof, the final sentence of footnote 12 is
revealing:
The defendants do not suggest persuasively that the particular law
enforcement needs served by checkpoints could be met without reliance on routine checkpoint stops.141

The statement is noteworthy enough for its lack of factual support. 42 More importantly, however, it seems to imply the Court's
willingness to impose on the detainee the burden of proving that
law enforcement needs could be better served through other means,
Such an allocation of the burden of proof would indeed be novel
doctrine. The Court's suggestion that respondents did not show
persuasively that law enforcement needs could be met without the
use of warrantless, causeless programs runs counter to the longstanding principle that the Government must prove the need for an
exception to the warrant requirement. 143 Respondents established
to the satisfaction of the Court that the law enforcement conduct at
issue constituted a seizure under the fourth amendment and that
their rights to privacy and personal security had been impinged.
They also established the seizures had been based on standardless,
random law enforcement practices. Given these considerations, the
Government should have been compelled to prove the need for conducting such operations.
CONCLUSION

The Martinez-Fuertedecision is troublesome in five significant aspects. The first two relate to the procedure the Supreme Court utiFlorida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
140. See Brief for Respondents at 42-44, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
141. 96 S. Ct. at 3082 n.12 (emphasis added).
142. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
143. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762 (1969); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); MacDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
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lized in reaching its decision; the remainder involve substantive
fourth amendment doctrine.
The most significant procedural point is the demonstrated inefficiency of the Court as a fact-finding body when it is faced with complex and contradictory statistics. Drawing empirical conclusions
about the need and effectiveness of traffic-checking operations in
the present context of rampant unlawful immigration is a difficult
task. The Court's failure to adequately perform this task was an inevitable result of its decision to cite only those statistics which appeared to support its conclusion. In addition, the Court cast a confusing shadow over established evidentiary procedure by trifling
with the allocation of the burden of proof with respect to the constitutionality of warrantless law enforcement practices.
Substantively, the Supreme Court has sacrificed the principles of
the fourth amendment for the expediency of an operation which unjustifiably burdens millions of law-abiding motorists annually, employs discretionary and standardless official detention and interrogation, and which is of nominal value when viewed in the context
of reasonable and less restrictive alternatives. Further, the Court
rejected the clear doctrinal background established by AlmeidaSanchez, Brignoni-Ponce, and Ortiz, fashioning an opinion inconsistent with those precedents. Finally, Martinez-Fuerte provides a dangerous potential for massive discrimination against a
large ethnic minority group residing lawfully in the country. The
sanctioning of selective referrals to secondary inspection areas on
nothing more than an individual's ethnic appearance is perhaps the
most frightening result of Martinez-Fuerte. It is hoped that one
day this final aspect will be a catalyst for an overruling of Martinez-Fuerte by a more enlightened Supreme Court.
VICTOR SALERNO

